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THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND FEDERAL
COMMON LAW: A NEW APPROACH
Ingrid Wuerth*
International human rights cases brought under the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS) I raise a host of issues: whether the alleged conduct vio-
lates well-established international law,2 the applicability and scope of
various forms of secondary liability,3 the contours of state action,4 the
extension of liability to private individuals and corporations,5 the pos-
sible award of punitive damages,6 application of alter ego and veil
piercing doctrines,7 whether plaintiffs must exhaust their remedies,8
and so on. After Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,' courts and commentators
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. For helpful comments, thanks to
Curt Bradley, Tai-Heng Cheng, Jacob Cogan, Harlan Cohen, John Coyle, Bill Dodge,
Chimene Keitner, John Knox, Peter Margulies, Mike Ramsey, Anthea Roberts, Bo
Rutledge, Ralph Steinhardt, Paul Stephan, Beth Stephens, Ed Swaine, and Amanda
Tyler. Thanks also to participants in a faculty workshop at the University of Virginia
School of Law and the Fourth Annual Potomac Foreign Relations Law Roundtable.
Rachel Gore and Tyler Hagenbuch did excellent research for this Article.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States.").
2 See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 185 (2d Cir. 2009); Viet. Ass'n
for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2008).
3 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244,
257-59 (2d Cir. 2009); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 288 (2d
Cir. 2007).
4 See, e.g., Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 188; Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303,
1316-18 (11th Cir. 2008); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1995); In re
Sinaltrainal Litig., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1289-91 (S.D. Fla. 2006), affd in part, vacated
in part sub nom., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009); Doe v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2005).
5 See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-41.
6 See, e.g., Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006); In re XE Servs.
Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 577 (E.D. Va. 2009).
7 See, e.g., In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 270-74 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
8 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 829 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
9 542 U.S. 692 (2004). The Court in Sosa held that a claim of unlawful detention
by Mexican officials was not actionable under the ATS, but it reasoned that cases
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have generally understood some of these issues as governed by federal
common law 0 and others by international law; the choice between
these two sources of law is often presented as binary." Some forms of
this approach can be analogized to Bivens'2 actions, with federal com-
mon law providing the cause of action and remedy, while interna-
tional law supplies the conduct-regulating rules of decision.13 It may
be fair to say that the binary approach has become the prevailing nar-
rative of ATS litigation.
There is, however, another way to understand the relationship
between federal common law14 and international law in ATS cases.
Federal common law might be understood as applying to all of these
aspects of ATS litigation, including the substantive standard for liabil-
ity, although some aspects of that federal common law (including the
substantive standard of liability) are closely linked to international
law. Thus, the relationship between federal common law and interna-
based on clearly established norms of international law (which did not include short-
term detention) could go forward. See id. at 724-25. For an introduction to the Sosa
case, see Brad R. Roth, Scope of Alien Tort Statute-Arbitrary Arrest and Detention as Viola-
tions of Custom, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 798 (2004).
10 Courts have occasionally held or suggested that some of these issues are gov-
erned by state or foreign law. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 949 (9th
Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 392 (9th Cir. 2003), dismissed, 403 F.3d 708
(9th Cir. 2005); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d
493, 496 (9th Cir. 1992).
11 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 147-48 (2d Cir. 2010);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 260 (2d Cir.
2009); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 540 F.3d 254, 266 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Katzmann, J., concurring); id. at 287 (Hall, J., concurring); Unocal 395 F.3d at
948-49; id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F.
Supp. 2d at 256; BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN
U.S. COURTs 35 (2d ed. 2008); William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort
Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 639 (2006); Paul L.
Hoffman & Daniel A. Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common Law and Aiding and
Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 47, 52
(2003); Chimene I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS
L.J. 61, 65 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and Human Rights
Claims Against Corporations Under the Alien Tort Statute, in HuMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 137, 142 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2005). For a different argument,
see Anthony J. Sebok, Taking Tort Law Seriously in the Alien Tort Statute, 33 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 871, 897 (2008), promoting a "global tort law" in ATS cases.
12 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 390-98 (1971).
13 See Casto, supra note 11, at 640; Ernest A. Young, Sosa and the Retail Incorpora-
tion of International Law, 120 HARv. L. REv. F. 28, 31, 34-35 (2007), http://www.
harvardlawreview.org/issues/1 20/february07/forum_417.php.
14 Federal common law is discussed infra Part I.A.
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tional law is not binary but instead is best understood on a continuum,
with certain aspects of ATS litigation governed by federal common law
that is tightly linked to international law, other aspects governed by
federal common law that is not derived from international norms, and
still others that fall somewhere in between. The extent to which fed-
eral common law is tied to international law in ATS cases is deter-
mined then by the inferred intentions of Congress and separation of
powers because these are the bases upon which the development of
federal common law in ATS cases is authorized after Sosa.15 Congres-
sional authorization and separation-of-powers considerations are
linked, however, to the content of international law. Finally, accord-
ing to this approach, the federal common law applied in ATS cases is
best understood as sui generis-it is its own enclave of federal com-
mon law that is not necessarily binding or preemptive outside the con-
text of ATS litigation.16 These distinctions would not make a
difference in the outcome of Sosa, of course. Whether we call it cus-
tomary international law, or "international law cum common law,"17
Alvarez-Machain's ATS claim based on short-term unlawful detention
did not meet the high bar imposed by the Sosa Court.18 Nevertheless,
applying international law as part of a federal common law that gov-
erns all aspects of ATS may change the outcome of cases that turn on
issues like secondary and corporate liability.
Moreover, it is preferable on descriptive, doctrinal, and norma-
tive grounds, as Part I below explains. Part I begins by describing the
prevailing views on federal common law and the rule of decision in
ATS cases. It then explains that applying federal common law to all
substantive issues in ATS cases is preferable. In short, no issues in ATS
cases are actually resolved through application of "pure" international
law-instead, the law applied is filtered through the particular history
15 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725-31 (2004); see also Curtis A.
Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie,
120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 893-97 (2007) (summarizing the Sosa Court's holding that the
ATS was purely jurisdictional and grants of federal jurisdiction were not the same as
grants to create federal common law); cf AnthonyJ. BelliaJr. & Bradford R. Clark,
The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 59-75 (2009) (emphasizing
courts' historical application of the law of nations to implement separation of
powers).
16 Cf William S. Dodge, Bridging Erie: Customary International Law in the U.S. Legal
System after Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 12 TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 87, 88 (2004) (sug-
gesting based on Sosa that "[tjhe Court seems inclined to address the role of custom-
ary international law in the U.S. legal system issue-by-issue, incorporating it for some
purposes but not others").
17 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
18 See id. at 733.
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and origins of the ATS itself, along with other factors unique to the
United States. Descriptively, the federal common law approach is
more accurate. Doctrinally, courts and litigants have wasted much
time and energy choosing between "international" and "domestic"
law, neither of which alone provides a satisfactory resolution of most
contested issues. Normatively, federal courts may avoid (in whole or
in part) the charge that they misunderstand customary international
law, and they may be in a position to develop some norms of custom-
ary international law that are not yet fully developed, depending in
part on the intentions of Congress and the executive branch. Part I
concludes by explaining how a federal common law approach would
work, although one might agree that federal common law applies to
all aspects of ATS litigation but disagree with the specific conclusions
reached here about congressional intent and deference to the execu-
tive branch. Parts II and III explain how issues of secondary and cor-
porate liability would be analyzed under the federal common law
approach. The examples explored in this section illustrate why the
choice between international and domestic law are not satisfactory.
Part IV explores how the international law of prescriptive jurisdiction
limits the kinds of ATS cases that can go forward.
I. FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND THE RULE OF DECISION IN ATS CASES
The Court in Sosa held that, based on the ATS, federal courts can
recognize a private cause of action for violations of international law
that are "accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms"19 of
assaults against ambassadors, safe conducts, and piracy. The Sosa
Court was clear that the modern ATS cause of action is generated by
federal common law (circumscribed by the content of modern inter-
national law); 20 it was less clear about the nature of the substantive,
rule-of-decision law applied in ATS cases.
19 Id. at 724-25.
20 See id. at 732 ("[W]e are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize
private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm
with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted."); id. at 738 ("[The defendants' con-
duct] violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as to the sup-
port the creation of a federal remedy."); id. ("Creating a private cause of action . . .
would go beyond any residual common law discretion we think it appropriate to
exercise.").
[VOL. 85:51934
2010] THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW
A. The Rule-of-Decision Law Applied in ATS Cases
There are, roughly speaking, three possibilities. First, customary
international law might be a different kind of federal common law
than the federal common law that provides the cause of action.
Under one version of this view, customary international law is already
federal common law without the need for incorporation by a federal
statute, but other issues in ATS litigation would presumably be gov-
erned by the standard post-Erie2 federal common law, which does
need some basis in domestic positive law. 22 As international law does
not itself provide a civil cause of action for ATS cases, presumably that
aspect of ATS litigation would be covered by this second form of fed-
eral common law, consistent with the language in Sosa itself.23 The
federal common law that provides the cause of action is to be devel-
oped by the courts as other post-Erie common law; the substantive rule
of decision is, on the other hand, simply supplied by customary inter-
national law as developed independent of the U.S. courts themselves.
Sosa does not, however, compel the view that two different kinds of
federal common law are at work in ATS cases.
Another possibility is that customary international law in ATS
cases is not any sort of federal common law at all, but is simply applied
directly as international law,24 like the application of foreign law in
some cases in U.S. courts.25 This may be how some courts understand
21 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
22 See Casto, supra note 11, at 641-42 ("[T]here is little doubt that international
law is incorporated into United States domestic law as a form of federal common
law. . . . Therefore the international norms that are essential to the existence of a
cause of action in ATS litigation are technically classified as a type of domestic law.
But the branch of federal common law that incorporates international law is signifi-
cantly different from other types of federal common law."). A variation of this posi-
tion is that customary international law lacks any status as federal common law absent
incorporation by the political branches, but is applied as the rule of decision in ATS
cases because it has been incorporated into domestic law by the ATS. Courts lack
power to develop customary international law as federal common law, although they
do have the power to develop the cause of action as other federal common law is
developed. This variation is obviously distinct with respect to the status of customary
international law generally, but it would also view customary international law as fed-
eral law, but beyond the power of the courts to develop; because it shares these two
characteristics, I have grouped it here.
23 See id. at 642.
24 Cf Vdzquez, supra note 11, at 142 ("The opinion [in Sosa] strongly suggests
that the courts are to look to international law to determine whether a primary rule of
international law has been violated. If such a violation has occurred, the existence of
a secondary rule entitling the plaintiff to relief is a matter ofjudge-made federal com-
mon law.").
25 See Young, supra note 13, at 31, 34-35.
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what they are doing post-Sosa,26 but this view is not compelled by the
Sosa case itself. It is in tension with the original application of interna-
tional law under the ATS because that law was understood as part of
the general law in 178927 (thus the cause of action and rule of deci-
sion law did not come from different sources), although all
approaches would be in some tension with the original. In any event,
under both this approach and the first, federal courts simply apply
customary international law as the rule of decision, but at least in the-
ory do not control its development and content, even as applied in
federal courts (although they do partially control the creation of a
cause of action or remedy).28
Advanced here is a third possibility: both the cause of action and
the rule of decision in ATS cases after Sosa are governed by the same
kind of judge-made, post-Eie federal common law. This approach
does not have a natural constituency in the academy, as it tracks
neither the "modernist"29 nor the "revisionist"30 views that emerged
prior to Sosa and which have dominated much of the scholarship
since.31 Revisionists argue that customary international law is not part
26 See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(analogizing ATS cases to post-Erle diversity cases in which federal courts apply state
law).
27 See Young, supra note 13, at 31.
28 The differences between the first and second approaches go in part to the
nature of customary international law as federal law under Articles III and VI of the
Constitution rather than affecting the outcome of ATS cases themselves. See Dodge,
supra note 16, at 100-07.
29 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1555, 1561-62 (1984); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?,
111 HARv. L. REv. 1824, 1852-60 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About
Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM
L. REV. 371, 376 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International
Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FoRDHAm L. REv. 393, 433, 447 (1997).
30 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Citique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 815, 852-53
(1997); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 47-48 (1995); see also Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary
International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 392 (2002) (suggesting that whether the mod-
ernists or revisionists are correct really depends on how different the new federal
common law is from pre-Erie general common law and therefore "whether customary
international law can fit within the established bounds of this new federal common
law").
31 See Young, supra note 13, at 28 ("Sosa . .. has become something of a Ror-
schach blot, in which each of the contending sides in the debate over the domestic
status of customary international law (CIL) sees what it was predisposed to see any-
way."); see also Bradley et al., supra note 15, at 924-35 (positing the areas in which the
debate as to the status of customary international law and domestic law will be most
1936 [VOL. 85-5
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of domestic U.S. law unless the political branches incorporate it into
domestic law; they tend not to like federal common law. Modernists
argue that customary international law is part of federal common law
even without incorporation by the political branches and generally see
ATS litigation as applying customary international law that has inde-
pendent status as federal common law even outside the ATS context.
In my view, however, understanding virtually all issues in ATS litiga-
tion as governed by federal common law,3 2 the development of which
is understood to have been authorized by Congress through the enact-
ment of the ATS,33 makes the most sense in the post-Erie ATS land-
scape created in Sosa.
This approach might seem foreclosed by the Court's conclusion
in Sosa that, as enacted in 1789, the ATS was jurisdictional only, and
did not give courts the power to create new causes of action or "mold
substantive law."3 4 In discussing the post-Efie application of the ATS,
however, the Court acknowledges that judges "will find a substantial
element of discretionary judgment in the decision,"3 5 that "federal
courts may derive some substantive law in a common law way,"3 6 and
that courts are, in fact, creating causes of action based on interna-
tional law.3 7 Equally significantly, the key limitation that Sosa places
on modern ATS litigation-it must "rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have rec-
prevalent in the next decade); William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the
Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARv. L. REv. F. 19, 19-21 (2007), http://www.harvardlaw
review.org/issues/120/februaryO7/forum_407.php (claiming revisionists misrepre-
sent Sosa and fail to provide legitimacy for an incorporation requirement); Ralph G.
Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future
of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2241, 2290-92
(2004) (proposing The Human Rights Abuse Compensation and Deterrence Act as a
solution to the debate). Some post-Sosa scholarship does not take a position on these
earlier debates. See, e.g., Keitner, supra note 11, at 66 n.19.
32 Exceptions include issues governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and the application of canons of statutory
interpretation, which are not generally understood as part of federal common law.
33 See Koh, supra note 29, at 1843-44 ("Much of the federal courts' lawmaking in
the human rights area represents statutory gap-filling, particularly with respect to stat-
utes such as the ATCA and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).").
34 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004).
35 Id. at 726.
36 Id. at 729.
37 Id. at 725 ("[T]here are good reasons for a restrained conception of the discre-
tion a federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this
kind.").
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ognized" 38-is unchanged by viewing the international law applied in
ATS cases, as well as the cause of action itself, as federal common law.
Moreover, this approach is preferable on descriptive, doctrinal, and
normative grounds.
B. Federal Common Law as the Rule of Decision: Advantages
Understanding international law as federal common law in ATS
cases puts courts' decision-making on more accurate conceptual foot-
ing as a descriptive matter. One of the key questions that courts must
wrestle with in ATS litigation-whether the international norm in
question enjoys the same level of consensus and specificity that piracy,
violations of safe conducts, and assaults against ambassadors enjoyed
in 1789-is not one that bears any real relation to modem customary
international law. To be sure, U.S. courts must examine the content
of contemporary international law qua international law to determine
whether to supply a cause of action, but they do so through a lens
derived entirely from the unique nature of the ATS statute in the U.S.
legal system. The substantive conduct-regulating standards that
emerge obviously correspond to a subset of customary international
law, but determining what norms are part of that subset is a uniquely
U.S. undertaking. The dual-sources approach also trades at times
upon a static, bright-line view of international law, pursuant to which
"the court does not make international law; rather it discovers pre-
existing rules that have been 'legislated through the political actions
of the governments of the world's states.' "3 9
One need not view customary international law as radically (or
even especially) indeterminate to reject this description of what courts
actually do in some ATS cases. These cases call upon domestic courts
to translate international norms into domestic civil litigation, which
often means applying norms developed in international criminal law
to domestic civil law and wrestling with questions of individual, corpo-
rate, and secondary liability that are in some state of evolution and
flux in customary international law. To say, for example, that courts
have merely "discovered" that aiding and abetting liability in civil cases
requires a mens rea of purpose, 4 0 or that they merely "discovered"
38 Id.
39 Casto, supra note 11, at 642 (quoting Henkin, supra note 29, at 1561-62).
40 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d
Cir. 2009); cf Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 30, at 855 (making this point about
customary international law generally).
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that corporations can be held civilly liable under international law,4 1
is entirely unconvincing.
Doctrinally, courts and commentators have struggled to deter-
mine whether international law or domestic federal common law gov-
erns questions such as the existence and scope of secondary liability
and the viability of ATS claims against corporations. In fact, neither
alternative is fully convincing. These questions are critical to the
scope of the ATS, because they help define the kind of injury that is
actionable. The statute is designed to redress violations of interna-
tional law, and it would thus be odd to conclude that these issues
should be resolved without reference to international law. On the
other hand, international law is still developing in these areas,42 to
some extent because international law relies itself on domestic law
and international tribunals to help develop these doctrines through
enforcement.43 It would thus be odd to conclude that they must be
resolved in toto with no relationship to domestic law. Treating these as
questions of federal common law that are developed with reference to
international law is a better approach in ATS cases. It is also doctri-
nally superior because it avoids the threshold question of which kind
of law to apply44 and allows courts to focus on the more significant
questions: the content of domestic and international law, and the
intentions of Congress and the executive branch. 45
Normatively, although it may seem counterintuitive, this
approach may foster and encourage the development of international
law and enhance the position of U.S. courts in the international com-
munity. As I describe below, by applying federal common law, courts
may arguably rely on (and foster the development of) some interna-
tional norms that are not yet clearly established in particular contexts,
at least when doing so would not violate international law in other
respects. There are relatively few international prosecutions for viola-
tions of international law and even fewer civil claims in domestic
courts. Many of the questions that arise in ATS cases lack well-devel-
41 In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
42 See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsi-
bility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 450 (2001); discussion infra Part III.
43 With the exception of the Rome Statute, for example, treaties generally do not
set out the mens rea requirements for aiding and abetting liability, leaving that issue
to domestic implementation and to international tribunals. See discussion infra Part
II.C.
44 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 827-28 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(applying exhaustion as a "prudential principle" in the "wake of Sosa," in part to avoid
deciding whether exhaustion is substantive or nonsubstantive).
45 See infra notes 58-70 and accompanying text; infra Part II.C.2.
1939
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oped antecedents in international or foreign domestic tribunals;4 6 it is
thus unsurprising that U.S. courts are called upon to fill gaps or
decide between different standards or analogies. Consider issues that
arise in corporate aiding and abetting cases, such as the appropriate
mens rea standard47 and whether corporate liability is best under-
stood as just one kind of liability for private parties generally based in
part on analogies to international criminal law, or whether it is best
analogized to the law of state responsibility; these issues were raised in
the Talisman case in the Second Circuit.48 Customary international
law itself does not provide a clear answer to these questions, and it is
unattractive to pretend that it does for the sake of resolving particular
ATS cases purportedly on the basis of "pure" international law.
Moreover, because application of international norms in ATS
cases may rely in part on uniquely U.S. concerns, acknowledging that
U.S. courts are actually applying federal common law is normatively
superior because it is more accurate, and because it may help avoid
the charge that the United States misunderstands the content and rel-
evant sources of international law. 4 9 Thus there may be reasons,
based on the intentions of Congress, to extend ATS liability to corpo-
rations that are relevant only in the context of ATS litigation;50 simi-
larly, U.S. courts may be authorized to move between criminal and
civil liability based on the origins of the ATS itself and on the inferred
intentions of Congress rather than on international law standing
alone.5 1 And, of course, as discussed above, a critical, overarching
inquiry in ATS cases-deciding whether the underlying norm meets
the requisite level of specificity and universality-is one that is based
46 See generally Andre Nollkaemper, Internationally Wrongful Acts in Domestic Courts,
101 AM.J. INT'L L. 760, 795 (2007) ("Since international law determines only general
principles, leaves much of the detail of the fashioning of relief to the domestic level,
and relies on domestic law to supplement it with necessary detail and to adjust it to
the domestic context, different states will inevitably come up with different
responses.").
47 See infra Part II.C.
48 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258
-59 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Christopher Greenwood,
CMG, QC in Support of Defendant-Appellee at 10-28, Presbyterian Church of Sudan,
582 F.3d 244 (No. 07-0016), 2007 WL 7073751 [hereinafter Brief of Professor Green-
wood] ("[I]nternational law contains no rule extending liability to corporate
entities.").
49 SeeJohn B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The
Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 8 (2009) (noting
that the United States is "regarded as something of a rogue actor" because of ATS
suits, in part because U.S. courts apply their "own divination of universal law").
50 See infta notes 58-70 and accompanying text; infra Part III.B.
51 See infra Part II.
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on how courts understand the intentions of the U.S. Congress with
respect to contemporary international law. Finally, acknowledging
that the courts are applying U.S. law clarifies ATS issues with respect
to prescriptive jurisdiction.52
C. A New Approach to ATS Litigation
How would this approach work? As already described, Sosa itself
sets a high standard for the basic types of international claims that can
go forward under the ATS, which would not change under this
approach. Nor would it change obviously procedural issues governed
by the law of the forum. With respect to questions like exhaustion, or
corporate and secondary liability, however, this approach would
require courts to apply federal common law based on the content and
clarity of international law (where international law provides a clear
answer, courts should generally apply it), the content of domestic law
(because Congress generally legislates with domestic norms as a back-
ground53 and because when the statute was originally enacted there
was no sharp separation between international law and the general
law5 4 ), and, in some circumstances, the views of the executive branch
as to the content of customary international law, particularly where
customary international law is unclear or in a state of flux.5 5 Courts
should also presume that Congress would be especially keen to avoid
any potential violations of international law, as in the context of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction;56 this general rule of statutory interpretation
applies with particular force in the ATS context.57
More generally, courts should give effect to two important com-
ponents of the Sosa opinion. First, as many commentators have
emphasized,58 the opinion admonishes courts to exercise "vigilant
doorkeeping,"5 9 restraint, and "caution in adapting the law of nations
52 See infra Part IV.
53 See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (noting the presump-
tion in favor of retaining common law when interpreting federal legislation); Smith v.
United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993) ("Congress generally legislates with
domestic concerns in mind.").
54 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004).
55 See infra Part II.C.2.
56 See infra Part IV.
57 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); cf
Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 CoLum. L. REV.
830, 900 (2006) (arguing that ATS litigation was intended to fulfill sovereign obliga-
tions of the United States, not to redress violations of international law generally).
58 See, e.g., Bellinger, supra note 49, at 5.
59 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
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to private rights."60 This theme of caution and restraint is a crucial
part of the opinion and it led to the defendants' victory; it is also a
theme that the Court links in several places back to the inferred inten-
tions of Congress.61 There is a second, equally important aspect to
the intentions of Congress, however: the Sosa opinion emphasizes that
Americans and members of the Constitutional Convention and the
First Congress were preoccupied with,62 anxious about,6 3 and "con-
cern[ed] over the inadequate vindication of the law of nations."64
The Court refers to the "serious consequences in international affairs"
that these violations threatened, 65 as well as their contemporary
nature as "'heinous actions' "66 committed by those who have become
"'an enemy of all mankind.'"67 This aspect of congressional intent
(both original and contemporary) is also fundamental to the opin-
ion.6 8 It is on this basis that the majority rejects the concurring Jus-
tices' view that no contemporary ATS cases should go forward at all; in
the view of the majority, the inferred intentions of Congress (both
modern and historical) provide the positive source of law that permits
federal common law making after Erie.69 The enactment of the ATS
60 Id. at 728.
61 See id. at 724 ("We think it is correct, then, to assume that the First Congress
understood that the district courts would recognize private causes of action for cer-
tain torts in violation of the law of nations, though we have found no basis to suspect
Congress had any examples in mind beyond those torts corresponding to Black-
stone's three primary offenses . . . ."); id. at 728 ("We have no congressional mandate
to seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of nations . ).
62 See id. at 715-16.
63 See id. at 719.
64 Id. at 717.
65 Id. at 715.
66 Id. at 732 (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)).
67 Id. (quoting Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring)).
68 The Court's reliance on contemporary events to identify the relevant inten-
tions of Congress has been criticized. SeeJulian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in
Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tart Statute, 2004 Sup. CT. REv. 153,
174.
69 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730-31 ("We think it would be unreasonable to assume that
the First Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all capacity to recognize
enforceable international norms simply because the common law might lose some
metaphysical cachet on the road to modern realism. Later Congresses seem to have
shared our view."). This is also howJustice Scalia's concurring opinion characterizes
justice Souter's majority opinion. See id. at 744-45 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). The Court's references to Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), and The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), might be
read as anchoring the federal common law in ATS litigation to the Constitution
rather than the intentions of Congress. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
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(as understood by the Court in Sosa) and subsequent events70 evince
an intent by Congress that specific, universal, and obligatory norms be
capable of civil redress in U.S. courts to safeguard international
affairs, peace, and the position of the United States in the interna-
tional community. There are thus two strands of congressional intent
at work in the Sosa opinion: a limit on the underlying international
norms that are actionable under the ATS, coupled with a strong desire
to see those norms vindicated in U.S. courts.
The sections below briefly describe in concrete terms how the
foregoing analysis would apply in particular contexts and conclude
that the likely outcomes are: (a) application of a knowledge standard
for aiding and abetting; (b) corporations can be held civilly liable in
ATS cases; and (c) only universal jurisdiction offenses are actionable
where no other basis for prescriptive jurisdiction exists.7 1 Although
an exhaustive exploration of these complicated issues is beyond the
scope of this article, the overall upshot would be a narrower set of
potential ATS cases and claims going forward because of the prescrip-
tive jurisdiction limits;72 but within those cases, claims against corpora-
tions for aiding and abetting liability would be actionable.
II. ACCOMPLICE LIABILrrY
This Part and the next analyze the approach advanced in this
Article in terms of two significant issues in many contemporary ATS
cases: accomplice liability and the liability of corporations. Courts and
commentators considering these issues have frequently focused on
whether federal common law or international law applies. If interna-
Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981); see also Note, An Objection to Sosa-And to the New
Federal Common Law, 119 HARv. L. REV. 2077, 2082 (2006) (noting an area of federal
courts' authority that "derives not from any act of Congress, but rather from constitu-
tional implication"). Even if constitutional underpinnings might be seen as an addi-
tional source of authority for the development of federal common law in the context
of the ATS, the Court's opinion makes clear that congressional authorization is of
fundamental significance. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727. This is the basis for the limitation
of ATS claims to international norms that are sufficiently clear and universal. See id.
70 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730-31 (discussing the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006))).
71 To be clear about the structure of the argument, one might agree that federal
common law governs the substantive aspects of ATS litigation, but disagree with this
view of congressional intent and/or with the way that the specific issues of secondary
and corporate liability are resolved in the following sections.
72 Aside from prescriptive jurisdiction limits, ATS cases should be limited to a
narrow set of underlying international offenses because of the Court's reasoning that
they must meet a high standard for specificity and universality. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at
724.
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tional law applies, determining its content has proven difficult in both
contexts, in part due to a number of framing issues. For example,
many of the relevant cases are criminal; if the question is framed nar-
rowly-whether international law itself provides civil aiding and abet-
ting liability for international human rights offenses-the answer
seems to be "no," but if the question is framed more broadly, to
include international criminal norms, then the answer is more likely
to be "yes."73 As a second example, if the question of corporate liabil-
ity is framed broadly, in terms of nonstate actors generally (does inter-
national law impose duties on nonstate actors?), the answer is a
qualified "yes," 74 but if the question is framed specifically in terms of
corporations, the answer is more likely to be "no."75 There are other
contested issues, too, including the mens rea standard for aiding and
abetting liability. These questions are not definitively answered by
customary international law itself; in truth, federal courts in ATS cases
are developing both domestic federal law and customary international
law as they resolve issues like this in ATS cases.
A. Domestic v. International Law
Neither international law nor domestic common law provides a
fully satisfactory source of law for accomplice liability in ATS cases.7 6
Applying stand-alone domestic common law-drawn, for example,
from the Restatement of Torts77-ignores the significance of accom-
plice liability in determining what conduct is actionable under the
73 Not surprisingly, those who favor restricting or eliminating ATS cases frame
the question narrowly, while those in favor of more expansive ATS liability frame the
question in broader terms. Compare Bradley et al., supra note 15, at 929 (suggesting
that corporate aiding and abetting liability is improper under the ATS), with Keitner,
supra note 11, at 85-86, 92 (suggesting that international criminal law informs what is
actionable civil conduct under the ATS).
74 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Katzmann,J., concurring) ("[The Second Circuit has] repeatedly treated the issue of
whether corporations may be be held liable under the ATCA as indistinguishable
from the question of whether private individuals may be.").
75 Brief of Professor Greenwood, supra note 48, at 10-19.
76 This subpart considers accomplice liability generally (for both individual and
corporate defendants). The next section analyzes corporate liability specifically. See
infra Part II.B.
77 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 287-89 (Hall, J., concurring) (discussing Supreme
Court cases relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts to establish federal com-
mon law on aiding and abetting).
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ATS. This suggests, as some have reasoned,'7 8 that the content of
international law should be relevant; if international law clearly
rejected aiding and abetting liability, for example, this would be a rea-
son to reject ATS cases based on aiding and abetting liability. On the
other hand, accomplice liability is relatively undeveloped in interna-
tional law, in part because it is often left to domestic law or interna-
tional tribunals themselves to determine its content.79 Thus,
international law itself points toward the development of norms of
accomplice liability by domestic legal systems and international tribu-
nals, making its content unclear and undermining the binary
approach.80 For this reason, too, the text of the statute, which refers
in part to any "civil action by an alien for tort only, committed in viola-
tion of the law of nations"8 cannot be read to require the application
of international law as entirely distinct from domestic law. Standing
alone, neither domestic nor international law is a satisfactory source
for aiding and abetting norms; it is little wonder that courts have
devoted substantial resources in trying to answer this question, only to
generate a variety of opinions, none of them fully convincing.82
Some courts and commentators have reasoned that because
accomplice liability regulates conduct, Sosa requires courts to apply
78 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259
(2d Cir. 2009) ("Recognition of secondary liability is no less significant a decision
than whether to recognize a whole new tort in the first place.").
79 See infra Part II.C..
80 The district court in In re South African Apartheid Litigation reasoned that:
As the ATCA is merely ajurisdictional vehicle for the enforcement of univer-
sal norms, the contours of secondary liability must stem from international
sources. Ideally, the outcome of an ATCA case should not differ from the
result that would be reached under analogous jurisdictional provisions in
foreign nations such as Belgium, Canada, or Spain.
In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). In fact,
international law frequently leaves the details of secondary liability up to the imple-
menting court or jurisdiction, so this reasoning is unpersuasive.
81 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
82 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 259 (applying international law and
a purpose standard); Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (apply-
ing international law and a purpose requirement); id. at 287-89 (Hall,J., concurring)
(applying domestic law and a knowledge requirement); id. at 321, 331 (Korman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reasoning that corporations cannot be
held liable, but that if they could be, international law would supply the mens rea
standard); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 951 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying interna-
tional law and a mens rea of knowledge), reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 392 (9th Cir.
2003), dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); id. at 964 (Reinhardt, J., concurring)
(applying domestic law); In re S. Affican Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 256 (apply-
ing international law and a knowledge standard).
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standards derived entirely from international law.83 Sosa itself did not
involve questions of secondary liability, and the Court accordingly
held nothing with respect to this issue. Moreover, the Court's reason-
ing does not suggest that international law must supply the relevant
standard just because secondary liability norms regulate conduct. The
Court describes the historical understanding of the ATS, concluding
that when it was enacted, a few "torts in violation of the law of nations
were understood to be within the common law";8 4 this historical
understanding that the law of nations was part of the common law
obviously does not compel the conclusion that modern day interna-
tional law must supply accomplice liability standards free of any input
or development by the federal courts. If anything, it points in the
opposite direction, in favor of modern federal common law that
includes violations of the law of nations.
The Sosa Court then explains how the ATS should be applied in a
post-Erie world, concluding that courts can recognize causes of actions
for violations of international law but should do so only where the
claims "rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civi-
lized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized."85 Aiding and
abetting claims can only be brought if the underlying tort claim (e.g.,
genocide, torture, war crimes) meets this standard, and in this sense
they "rest" on an international norm of this character, but Sosa does
not suggest that the elements of aiding and abetting liability them-
selves must meet this high bar. Nor, for that matter, does it suggest
that this high standard needs to be met for all questions of interna-
tional law that arise in ATS cases. Indeed, the reasons it gives for
'judicial caution"86 do not fully apply to secondary liability claims
where the underlying norm already meets this high standard. Equally
significant, what is most contested in ATS cases is not aiding and abet-
ting liability itself (which seems to be generally accepted),87 but
83 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 259; Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277
(Katzmann, J., concurring); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 256; see
also Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1026-27 (W.D. Wash. 2005)
(holding specific facts of a claim brought under ATS must violate international norms
to be recoverable), affd, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007); Keitner, supra note 11, at
73-83 (discussing accomplice liability under the ATS).
84 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004).
85 Id. at 725.
86 Id.
87 It seems undisputed that aiding and abetting liability is well established in
international criminal law, and the arguments against applying it to the civil context
in ATS cases appear weak. See infra Part II.B. Apparently no court has rejected aiding
and abetting liability as a whole in ATS cases. Some commentators have objected to
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instead either one element of the cause of action (state of mind) or
corporate liability itself. Nothing about Sosa suggests that its univer-
sality and specificity requirements apply to every element of the cause
of action when the underlying violation meets the high standard, as
does aiding and abetting liability itself.
The Sosa opinion gives five reasons for "judicial caution." The
first two reasons are linked: because the common law is now under-
stood as being made (rather than discovered), federal courts gener-
ally apply common law with the implicit or explicit authorization of
Congress." But in ATS cases raising aiding and abetting claims, Con-
gress is already understood to have permitted a claim based on the
underlying conduct-that is, the underlying conduct is undesirable
and threatening enough to make it comparable to piracy, violations of
safe conducts, and assaults on ambassadors-and even the claim for
aiding and abetting liability itself meets this standard. What is most
contested are the elements of such a claim, and under both domes-
tic8 9 and international law,90 the details of aiding and abetting liability
are frequently left to courts for development. Third, courts must be
careful about inferring a private cause of action where Congress has
not done so specifically.9 1 But there is nothing to infer from the fact
that Congress did not explicitly create a cause of action for secondary
liability when it did not explicitly create a cause of action for the sub-
stantive tort in the first place. And there is even less to infer from the
fact that although aiding and abetting liability itself meets the high
Sosa standard, the state of mind element for that cause of action is not
well specified. Thus, once the high bar for recognizing a claim based
on international law is met, there is little reason to impose a second
high bar to claims of secondary liability, and even less reason to
impose a high bar for specific elements of secondary liability claims.
Fourth, the Sosa Court noted that potential foreign relations
problems may arise in ATS cases that limit foreign governments' treat-
ment of their own citizens.9 2 Secondary liability claims are almost uni-
aiding and abetting cases against corporations, see, e.g., Bradley et al., supra note 15, at
924-29, but that is different from arguing against aiding and abetting liability as a
whole. Corporate liability is addressed below in Part III.
88 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725-26.
89 Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006) (criminalizing aiding and abetting generally, but
not providing the applicable mens rea). See generally Richard C. Mason, Civil Liability
for Aiding and Abetting, 61 Bus. IAw. 1135, 1139-40 (2006) (noting the "nationwide
acceptance of civil liability for aiding and abetting").
90 See infra notes 97-111 and accompanying text.
91 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
92 See id. at 727-28.
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versally brought against private parties, however, not foreign
governments themselves, and adopting a federal common law (rather
than a pure international law approach) may provide greater opportu-
nity for deference to the executive branch. Recall, too, that under the
approach advanced here, ATS claims are subject to the standard inter-
national law limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction. Cases for which
there is no jurisdictional basis under international law would not go
forward.9 3 Fifth, the Sosa opinion returns to the question of congres-
sional authorization, in particular declarations of non-self-execu-
tion,94 which have nothing specifically to do with secondary liability.
Applying Sosa's heightened standard to aiding and abetting issues
also runs counter to the second strand of congressional intent that the
Sosa Court emphasized: the desire to see certain violations of interna-
tional law redressed in U.S. courts.95 Permitting aiding and abetting
claims to go forward based on this small set of core international law
violations actionable after Sosa vindicates this second aspect of con-
gressional intent. Finally, as suggested above, even if the heightened
standard from Sosa applies to secondary liability, aiding and abetting
itself meets that standard, thus expanding liability to a new set of
defendants. Thus, under either view, aiding and abetting liability
claims can go forward, the only question is whether Sosa's high stan-
dard applies to each element of the claim, including state of mind.
The question of the required state of mind is frequently delegated to
international courts and tribunals or to domestic implementation;
under these circumstances it makes little sense to require a high
degree of consensus within international law itself.
B. Accomplice Liability and Federal Common Law
Although Sosa's high requirements of specificity and universality
should not apply to accomplice liability issues, international law is
nonetheless relevant to determining the scope and content of accom-
plice liability in ATS cases. Turning specifically to aiding and abetting
liability, courts should recognize that such liability itself is well estab-
lished in international criminal law,96 although the precise mens rea
standard is not. Courts should accordingly permit aiding and abetting
93 See infra Part IV.
94 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728.
95 See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
96 Even those who seek to limit the scope of ATS liability generally concede that
aiding and abetting liability is recognized in international criminal law. See
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann,J.,
concurring) ("Indeed, the United States concedes, and the defendants do not dis-
pute, that the concept of criminal aiding and abetting liability is 'well established' in
1948 [VOL. 85:5
2010] THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW 1949
claims in ATS cases and acknowledge that they are developing federal
common law and customary international law with respect to the
mens rea requirement. There are several potential objections. First,
as discussed and rejected above, one could argue that Sosa's high stan-
dard applies here.
Second, aiding and abetting liability is well established in interna-
tional law in the criminal context, but not necessarily the civil. The
ATS itself, however, as understood in Sosa, provided civil remedies for
criminal conduct that violated the law of nations.97 Moreover, the
Court seemed unconcerned about moving between criminal conduct
and civil liability in both its discussion of the origins of the ATS98 and
in its suggestion that torture cases could go forward under the stan-
dard it had set out.99 Justice Breyer made the link between contempo-
rary international criminal law and civil remedies explicit; as he points
out, civil and criminal liability are closely linked in civil law jurisdic-
tions.'00 Note, however, that international law itself does not clearly
provide for aiding and abetting in civil cases-it is more accurate to
understand this as federal common law of the United States informed
by the content of international law than a direct application of inter-
national law. A third potential objection is that the Court has refused
in at least one case to imply a cause of action for aiding and abetting
where the statute in question did not provide for such liability.101 Cen-
tral Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,10 2 however, inter-
preted the Securities Exchange Act, a statute that prohibited certain
conduct, but not aiding and abetting.10 3 The ATS is not analogous
because its text does not itself prohibit any particular conduct, so
there is nothing to infer from the failure to include aiding and abet-
ting as prohibited conduct. A second distinction is that the ATS,
international law." (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21,
Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254 (No. 05-2326))); Bradley et al., supra note 15, at 927.
97 See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the judiciary Act of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 Am. J. INT'L L. 461, 480 (1989); William S. Dodge, The Historical
Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists, " 19 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 221, 226, 228 (1996).
98 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715-17.
99 See id. at 731 (discussing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)).
100 See id. at 762-63 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
101 See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
191 (1994); see also Bradley et al., supra note 15, at 926-27 (also making this
argument).
102 511 U.S. 164.
103 See id. at 173-75 (emphasizing repeatedly that the text of the statute controls
the Court's inquiry).
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unlike the Securities Exchange Act, is tied to the changing content of
customary international law. When courts in ATS cases permit aiding
and abetting claims to go forward they do so because customary inter-
national law contemplates such liability and because the statute itself
is specifically tied to conduct that violates international law.
C. Mens Rea
Courts have recognized aiding and abetting liability in ATS cases,
which is consistent with the foregoing analysis, but they have fre-
quently done so by purporting to apply international law directly, not
as part of federal common law. 0 4 This has created difficulty for the
question of mens rea. International criminal tribunals have applied a
knowledge standard in most cases,105 yet the Rome Statute for the
104 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244,
259 (2d Cir. 2009); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 264 (2d Cir.
2007) (Katzmann, J. concurring); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F. 3d 932, 947-53 (9th
Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 392 (9th Cir. 2003), dismissed, 403 F.3d 708
(9th Cir. 2005); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 250 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); cf Cabello v. Ferndndez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2005)
(applying aiding and abetting liability without clearly specifying the source of law).
Opinions that do analyze aiding and abetting as part of federal common law do so for
different reasons and by considering different factors than those advanced here. See
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 284 (Hall, J., concurring); Unocal, 395 F.3d at 963 (Reinhardt,
J., concurring).
105 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL04-15-A, Appeals Judgment, 11
546-49 (Oct. 26, 2009); Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judg-
ment, 366-67 (May 28, 2008); Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A,
Appeals Judgment, It 242-43 (Feb. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-
A, Appeals Judgment, 1 86 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 25,
2006); Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Judgment, 89 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb 28, 2005); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana,
Case No. ICTR-96-17-T-A, Appeals Judgment, 1 364 (Dec. 13, 2004); Prosecutor v.
Blaikic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, 50 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71-I,
Judgment and Sentence, 457 (July 15, 2004); Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-
98-32-A, Appeals Judgment, 1 102 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb.
25, 2004); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Judgment, 1 51 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case
No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, 1 387-89 (May 15, 2003); Prosecutor v. Bagilishema,
Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, Judgment, 1 32 (June 7, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kayishema,
Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Appeals Judgment, 1 198 (June 1, 2001); Prosecutor v. Aleksov-
ski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment, 1 162 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugosla-
via March 24, 2000); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment, 11
180-81 (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Judgment,
11 200, 229 (July 15, 1999); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judg-
ment, 1 245-49 (Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T,Judg-
ment, 11 537-45 (Sept. 2, 1998); Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (Zyklon B
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International Criminal Court appears to adopt a purpose standard for
at least some secondary offenses,' 0 6 although it is unclear precisely
what this standard will mean in practice,1 0 7 and its significance for
customary international law as a whole is disputed.os Some interna-
tional conventions on human trafficking also appear to adopt the
higher purpose standard.109 Many treaties and the statutes establish-
ing the ad hoc criminal tribunals provide for some kinds of accom-
plice liability for the conduct actionable in ATS cases, but without
Case), 1 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93 (1947); Trial of Wagner and
Six Others, 3 LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 23, 40-42, 94-95 (1946);
Trial of Werner Rohde and Eight Others, 5 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
54 (1946). But see United States v. von Weizsaecker (Ministries Case), in 14 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUN-
CIL LAw No. 10, at 662 (1949); Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, [1996] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n., ch. 2, arts. 2(3) (d), 17, 18, 20, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l.
106 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Andrea Reggio, Aiding and Abetting in
International Criminal Law: The Responsibility of Corporate Agents and Businessmen for
"Trading with the Enemy" of Mankind, 5 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 623, 647 (2005).
107 See Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confu-
sion in the Courts, 6 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 304, 315-16 (2008).
108 See Keitner, supra note 11, at 86-87 (noting that the Rome Statute does not
recognize official immunity defenses and reasoning that this may have caused the
drafters to restrict aiding and abetting liability more than customary international law
itself does).
109 See Council of Europe, Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human
Beings art. 21, May 16, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 197 [hereinafter Council of Europe, Traf-
ficking Convention] ("Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as
may be necessary to establish as criminal offences when committed intentionally, aid-
ing or abetting the commission of any of the offences established in accordance with
Articles 18 and 20 of the present Convention."); Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25,
Annex II, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001) [hereinafter U.N. Protocol]
(requiring criminalization of accomplice liability, apparently for intentional con-
duct); see also Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel
art. 9, Dec. 9, 1994, 2051 U.N.T.S. 394. The International Convention on the Sup-
pression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid art. III, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015
U.N.T.S. 243, provides international criminal liability for those who "directly abet,
encourage, or co-operate in the commission of the crime of apartheid" regardless of
the motive involved. Outside the human rights context, the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Transnational Organized Crime appears to require the criminalization of
intentional aiding and abetting of the laundering of proceeds of the crime. See
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime art. 6, Nov. 15,
2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings art. 2(3) (c), G.A. Res. 164, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess. Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A/52/49, at 389 (Jan. 8, 1998).
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specifying the applicable mens rea." 0 In these contexts, mens rea is
an issue that has been and continues to be developed through inter-
national criminal tribunals or which is sometimes left to the domestic
implementation of treaties by legislatures or courts. 1 ' In light of
both the uncertainty and the delegation, courts should accordingly
acknowledge that with respect to mens rea in aiding and abetting
cases, they are developing a federal common law based on interna-
tional law. The following sections explain how courts should choose
the appropriate state of mind standard in ATS cases.
1. Delegation and State of Mind
In picking the applicable standard for state of mind, the follow-
ing considerations are relevant. First, as described above, there is
some support for either knowledge or purpose as the standard under
110 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of the Demo-
cratic Kampuchea, as amended, Reach Kram No. NS/RKM/1004/006, Oct. 27, 2004,
art 29 (Cambodia) [hereinafter Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary
Chambers]; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6(1) (2000); Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, art. 3, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (May 25, 2000); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Annex, art. 6(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994);
Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons art. 1(b), June 9,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1529, 1530; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, art. 7(1), U.N. Doc. S/RES 827 (May 25, 1993);
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 4, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 3, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78
U.N.T.S. 277; Report of the International Law Commission, Principles of International
Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribuna4
[1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, 377, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER.A/1950/Add.1; see also
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappear-
ance art. 6, G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. Doc. A/61/488 (Dec. 20, 2006) (not yet in force).
The Geneva Conventions do not provide for accomplice liability for grave breaches,
but domestic statutes implementing them sometimes do. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2
(2006) (aiding and abetting); 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006) (war crimes); Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field arts. 49-50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
111 This kind of delegation is made explicit in the United Nations Convention
against Corruption, which provides in Article 27 that "[e]ach State Party shall adopt
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal
offence, in accordance with its domestic law, participation in any capacity such as an
accomplice, assistant or instigator in an offence established in accordance with this
Convention." United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, art.
27, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003).
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customary international law. In terms of evidence of customary inter-
national law, most treaties leave the mens rea requirement open (but
a few require purpose), while most international criminal tribunals
apply a knowledge standard.1 12
Second, and also mentioned above, treaties and the U.N. Security
Council resolutions creating the ad hoc criminal tribunals generally
do not specify mens rea, effectively delegating the issue to either
domestic implementing bodies or the tribunals themselves.11 s The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, for example, applied a
mens rea of knowledge for complicity in the form of aiding and abet-
ting, based on the Rwandan Penal Code, English law, and the Eich-
mann trial in Israel. 114 The U.S. statute 15 implementing the
112 See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
113 See supra note 110. See generally Beth Van Schaack, Atrocity Crimes Litigation:
2008 Year-in-Review, 7 Nw. U. J. Ir'L Hum. RTs. 170, 175 (2009) (describing the work
of international criminal tribunals (which are a primary source of authority for deter-
mining the mens rea standard in ATS cases) as "refashioning" international criminal
law "by more precisely identifying the elements of international crimes, forms of
responsibility, defenses, and other penal doctrines; and by adding content to custom-
ary international law concepts and vaguely-worded treaty provisions"); Andrew T. Guz-
man & Timothy L. Meyer, Explaining Soft Law (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 13534444, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1353444
(arguing that soft law can, in other contexts, be best understood in terms of delega-
tion). "Delegation" is sometimes used to describe a transfer of legislative power from
the United States to international institutions which include authority to create norms
that are in some sense binding. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of
International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1492, 1502-35 (2002). Delegation is used
here to describe the situation in which a treaty or other regime allows tribunals or
domestic implementation to resolve issues that are left open. This form of delegation
does itself not create norms that are binding on other parties, and to the extent it
allows each country to implement norms with different content, it does not transfer
power away from states but instead leaves greater discretion to them.
114 Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-96-10-A & ICTR-96-17-A, Appeals
Judgments, 364 (Dec. 13, 2004); Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-
71-T,Judgment, 457 (July 15, 2004); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T,
Judgment, 1 387-89 (May 15, 2003); Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-
1A-T Judgment, 1 32 (June 7, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A,
Appeals Judgment, 1 198 (June 1, 2001); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-
A, Appeals Judgment, 11 180-81 (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No.
ICTR 96-4-T,Judgment, 11 537-45 (Sept. 2, 1998). Similarly, the statute establishing
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia provides for aiding and abet-
ting liability but does not specify a mens rea. See Law on the Establishment of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes
Committed During the Period of the Democratic Kampuchea, Reach Kram No. NS/
RKM/1004/006, 2004, at. 29 (Cambodia). The indictment of Kaing Guek Eav from
the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges used knowledge. See Kaing Guek Eav
("Duch"), Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, Closing Order Indicting Kaing Guek
1953
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Convention against Torture (which requires states to criminalize
"complicity or participation in torture")" 6 provides liability for con-
spiracy,117 and a separate section of the U.S. criminal code would
allow for aiding and abetting prosecutions, without specifying mens
rea." 8 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
applied a knowledge standard based on its view of customary interna-
tional law, derived in part from Nuremburg cases."' 9
The issue of mens rea has thus largely been delegated to domes-
tic law or to the development of soft or customary international law.
In either case, this delegation by international law to international
tribunals or to domestic law strongly supports the application of
domestic mens rea standards in domestic cases that are based on
international law, especially domestic civil cases (because these uncer-
tain norms are being translated into a slightly different context), and
where the domestic law standard is consistent with some sources of
customary international law. In the United States, domestic common
law applies purpose in some criminal contexts,o20 but a knowledge
standard in civil cases.121 This domestic civil standard of knowledge is
Eav alias Duch, 1 161 (Feb. 21, 2003). Although the defense contested the applica-
tion ofjoint criminal enterprise liability and other issues, it did not object to the legal
standard for aiding and abetting. See Kaing Guek Eav ("Duch"), Case No. 001/18-07-
2007-ECCC/TC, Final Defence Written Submissions, 1135-36 (Nov. 11, 2009).
115 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006).
116 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment art. 4, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 85 U.N.T.S. 1465.
117 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(c).
118 Id. § 2.
119 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, It 245-49 (Dec.
10, 1998).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Morrow, 177 F.3d 272, 286 (5th Cir. 1999); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (a) (1985).
121 See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 286 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Hall, J., concurring); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1977); Mason,
supra note 89, at 1146-53; see also Nilay Vora, Federal Common Law and Alien Tort Statute
Litigation: Why Federal Common Law Can (and Should) Provide Aiding and Abetting Liabil-
ity, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 195, 219-21 (2009) (arguing that federal law provides for aid-
ing and abetting liability under the ATS). Note that treaties are not very specific
about actus reus requirements. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 77 (Katzmann,J., concur-
ring). Moreover, there is a relationship between the mens rea and actus reus stan-
dards. See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(applying a knowledge standard but dismissing many claims based on fairly stringent
actus reus test); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra, § 876 cmt. d; Nathan Isaac Combs,
Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. REv. 241, 267-78 (2005). These two
points support the overall argument advanced here: it makes little sense to view the
domestic courts' application of aiding and abetting liability as purely a matter of inter-
national law, for that law leaves a number of issues unresolved.
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a third factor that weighs in favor of applying a knowledge standard in
ATS cases. One might argue that instead of being delegated, the state
of mind requirement under customary international law is just uncer-
tain or in a state of development. The foregoing evidence clearly
points to some level of delegation, however, probably generated in
part by the uncertainty or the failure of treaty-makers to reach
agreement. 122
Some opinions in ATS cases have adopted a purpose standard. In
his concurring opinion in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank,12 3 for
example, Judge Katzmann concluded that a purpose standard should
be applied based on international law,124 and the Second Circuit
adopted this reasoning in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc.'25 Judge Katzmann acknowledged that some authority
pointed toward a knowledge standard; he picked purpose based on
Sosa's specificity and universality test, reasoning that cases applying
the knowledge standard would also find liability under the purpose
standard, making the later preferable.126 For the reasons articulated
above, however, Sosa's specificity and universality standard does not
apply to accomplice liability at all.12 7
Even if it did, aiding and abetting meets this standard, and the
very treaties and other sources that establish aiding and abetting liabil-
ity in international law also, in the main, permit delegation of the
mens rea standard to domestic implementation or development by
the courts. Application of the universality and specificity standard
thus permits domestic variation with respect to state of mind, making
application of the knowledge standard preferable in U.S. ATS cases.
Finally, note that if Judge Katzmann's view prevails, it underscores a
primary claim of this Article: that international law applied in ATS
cases is best understood as federal common law, because its content is
shaped by concerns that are unique to the United States (here, the
high Sosa standard for specificity and universality).
122 Arguably there may be less reason to defer to the executive branch if the state
of mind issue has been entirely delegated to domestic implementation or to interna-
tional tribunals. Treaties are generally implemented by the legislature rather than
the President acting alone. And if the issue were always delegated to domestic law,
then there would likely be no development of customary international law qua cus-
tomary international law; for matters of domestic law, the case for deference to the
executive branch is much more limited.
123 504 F.3d at 264 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
124 See id. at 270-77.
125 582 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2009).
126 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
127 See sup-a Part II.A.
1955
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2. Deference to the Executive Branch
Under some circumstances, courts in ATS cases should give mod-
est deference to the views of the executive branch as to what the con-
tent of customary international law should be, especially when that law
is still in development. 128 This deference is distinct from case-by-case
deference to the executive branch as to the foreign affairs implica-
tions of allowing the case itself to go forward;129 this Article expresses
no opinion about that kind of deference.130 The deference defended
here is to the executive branch's view on the content and develop-
ment of customary international law.
The ATS is best understood after Sosa as delegating to the courts
the power to make limited federal common law based on interna-
tional law, as discussed above. In general, where the courts are
involved in the development of domestic federal common law, there is
no particular reason to defer to the executive branch.131 In ATS cases,
however, domestic litigation has a two-fold relationship to customary
international law: the courts must interpret customary international
law as they develop federal common law and the courts' opinions
themselves may contribute to the formation of customary interna-
tional law.132 That is, on the latter point, other countries and interna-
tional actors may look to these U.S. decisions as evidence of the
content of international law, 133 and it is appropriate that the executive
128 See Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law Formation,
48 VA. J. INT'L L. 119, 125-26, 132-34 (2007) (discussing the formation of customary
international law generally).
129 See Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable Views of the Bush Admin-
istration, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 773, 789-92 (2008) (describing and evaluating this kind
of deference in ATS cases).
130 There are other potential reasons to defer to the executive branch; for exam-
ple, as part of the political question doctrine, the deference advanced here is just to
the role of the executive branch in the formation of customary international law in
ATS cases. See generally Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International
Claim Settlement by the President, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2003) (criticizing deference to
the executive branch in certain contexts).
131 See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649,
707-08 (2000) (noting that if customary international law is viewed as federal com-
mon law authorized by Congress, the basis for shifting the delegation to the executive
branch is unclear).
132 See Anthea Roberts, Comparative International Law 17-23 (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
133 See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buergenthal); Prosecutor v. Furundija, Case No. IT-9S-17/1-T, Judgment (Dec. 10,
1998) (citing Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)); Sarah H. Cleveland,
The Alien Tort Statute, Civil Society, and Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERs L. REv. 971,
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branch should be given some deference,' 3 4 based on its expertise and
informational advantages, 135 as well as its general role in the forma-
tion of customary international law 36 and its related function as bear-
ing the primary responsibility for treaty negotiation.1 7 Where the
executive branch can demonstrate a strong interest in (or prior posi-
tion with respect to) the formation of a particular norm of customary
international law, deference is especially appropriate.
975-80 (2004); Keitner, supra note 11, at 100; Roberts, supra note 132, at 19-20; see
also Statute of the International Court ofJustice art. 38, June 26, 1945, SS Stat. 1055,
1060 (directing the Court to apply "international custom" and "judicial decisions,"
the latter as "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law"); ANTHONY AusT,
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 10 (2005) (citing domestic court decisions as evi-
dence of custom); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 52 (7th
ed. 2008) (same); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (9th ed. 1992) (same); MAL-
com N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (5th ed. 2003) (same); Int'l L. Ass'n, Comm. on
Formation of Customary (Gen.) Int'l L., Statement of Principles Applicable to the
Formation of General Customary International Law 30 (2000), available at http://
www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/30 (follow "Conference Report
London 2000" hyperlink).
134 Cf Bellinger, supra note 49, at 8 ("When courts do consider customary interna-
tional law, there is also a risk that their interpretations could be in tension with those
advanced internationally by the executive branch."); Bradley, supra note 131, at
707-09 (discussing policy reasons for deference to the executive branch as to the
content of customary international law); Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregard-
ing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1261 (2007) (suggesting deference to the
executive branch with respect to the interpretation of customary international law, in
part because "the political branches of the United States play no well-defined role in
the lawmaking process").
135 See Ku & Yoo, supra note 68, at 181-99 (emphasizing the competence and
informational superiority of the executive branch over the courts, as well as its politi-
cal accountability).
136 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432-33 (1964) ("When
articulating principles of international law in its relations with other states, the execu-
tive branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and traditional
rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate of standards it believes desirable for
the community of nations and protective of national concerns."); Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L.
REv. 2047, 2084 n.150 (2005) (reasoning that deference to the executive branch is
warranted with respect to customary international law, described as "an amorphous
and evolving body of law, the content of which has always been informed by political
discretion and national self-interest"); Louis Henkin, The Power of the Executive Branch
of the United States Government to Violate Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
913, 921-22 (1986) (emphasizing in the context of customary international law "[t]he
President's special role in the United States Government, including the conduct of
the nation's foreign relations" and that "[t]he President sits at the intersection of the
domestic and international responsibilities of the United States").
137 See H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive
Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 527, 558-60 (1999).
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On the other hand, little deference should be afforded to the
executive branch in ATS cases as to the interpretation of customary
international norms that are already well developed or aspects of ATS
litigation with little relationship to customary international law. For
example, if the executive branch argued against aiding and abetting
liability as a whole in ATS cases, courts should afford this position lit-
tle deference because it contradicts well-established customary inter-
national law.138 Nothing prevents the executive branch from
advocating at the international level for a reversal of this rule, of
course, but courts cannot disregard the content of established rules of
customary international law without undercutting the ATS itself.
Affording deference to the executive branch with respect to custom-
ary international law that is unclear or in a state of development may,
in turn, influence the development of federal common law by the
courts, but the deference is based on the executive's role in develop-
ing customary international law not on a direct role for the executive
branch in domestic lawmaking. Finally, note that in this context viola-
tions of customary international law are not an issue-international
law does not compel states to adopt either knowledge or purpose as
the mens rea.139
Deferring to the executive branch has a number of potential
costs, including the possibility of inconsistent positions over time (in
part due to changes in administration), inconsistent positions from
one case to another, potential pressure by foreign governments and
corporations on the executive branch,140 and difficulties that may
arise when the government does not choose to express an opinion. 141
These problems are familiar from the foreign sovereign immunity
context, in which deference to the executive branch proved undesir-
able in cases that raised questions about the immunity of foreign sov-
ereigns,142 and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976143 was
eventually enacted.
138 Admittedly, this line will not always be easy to draw.
139 Consistent with the Charming Betsy canon, courts should interpret the ATS to
avoid violations of customary international law. In a situation where deference to the
executive branch and the Charming Betsy canon point in opposite directions, courts
should generally apply the canon. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use
of Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 338-50
(2005).
140 See Bellinger, supra note 49, at 11.
141 See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983); Bellin-
ger, supra note 49, at 11.
142 See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486; Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign
States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Rela-
tions of the H. Comm. on the judiciary, 94th Cong. 26-27 (1976) (statement of Monroe
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But in the foreign sovereign immunity context, the executive
branch made case-by-case decisions about the desirability of immunity
for particular parties. 1 4 4 The problems created by this kind of defer-
ence are highlighted by the Republic of South Africa's change of posi-
tion in In re South African Apartheid Litigation. 14 5 Initially South Africa
strongly opposed the litigation1 4 6 and sought the assistance of the
State Department, which filed a Statement of Interest urging the court
to dismiss the litigation. 1 4 7 Then, however, there was a change of
administration in South Africa1 4 8 and the litigation was narrowed
somewhat when some claims were dismissed; 49 South Africa now for-
mally supports the cases.150 These difficulties are minimized when
deference is afforded not with respect to the outcome of particular
cases, but as to formation and development of customary interna-
tional law; for example, the appropriate mens rea in aiding and abet-
ting cases, 15 1 as a matter of customary international law. This would
limit the kind of pressure foreign governments could bring to bear on
the executive branch in particular cases (at least in this context).
Inconsistency between cases would diminish the deference courts
should afford the executive branch, at least to the extent the inconsis-
tency suggested that the executive branch was using deference to
achieve desired outcomes in particular cases.
Leigh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State). See generally G. Edward White, The Transfor-
mation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REv. 1, 134-40 (1999)
(discussing the early twentieth-century shift from courts applying customary interna-
tional law in foreign sovereign immunity cases to deferring to the executive branch).
143 Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1330
(2006)).
144 See, e.g., Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-90 (1943).
145 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
146 Declaration by justice Minister Penuell Maduna on Apartheid Litigation in the
United States, July 11, 2003 [hereinafter Declaration by Justice Minister Penuell
Manduna], available at. http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id= 7 0180.
147 In re S. Affican Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 276-77 (describing the U.S.
government's statement of interest).
148 See David Glovin & Mike Cohen, South Affica Backs GM, Ford, IBM Apartheid
Lawsuit (Update 1), BLOOMBERG, Sept. 3, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601116&sid=A2xm-iMWNc7g.
149 In re S. Affican Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 243-45.
150 See Glovin & Cohen, supra note 148.
151 To be clear, case-by-case deference might be appropriate under certain cir-
cumstances, an issue beyond the scope of this Article, but the type of deference at
issue here is different.
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III. CORPORATE LIABILITY
ATS cases are frequently brought against corporations, 15 2 in part
because states that perpetrate human rights abuses are generally
immune from suit.15 3 Some courts have apparently concluded that
where international law generally imposes a duty on nonstate actors
with respect to certain conduct (such as war crimes, piracy, and geno-
cide),154 corporations, as one kind of nonstate actor, can be held lia-
ble for such conduct.155 Defendants and others have argued that
international law does not attribute liability to corporations at all.15 6
Plaintiffs and some commentators reason that U.S. law determines
who is liable, while international law governs the legality of the actual
conduct.157 As this Article went to press, the Second Circuit adopted
the defendants' position: corporations are not liable under ATS
because international law does not impose duties directly on
corporations. 1 5 8
A. Domestic v. International Law
As with accomplice liability, the choice between domestic and
international law is not a satisfactory one, although for slightly differ-
152 See Curtis A. Bradley, State Action and Corporate Human Rights Liability, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1823 (2010).
153 See Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 505,
509-11 (2008); Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty-U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of
International Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 627, 645-46 (2002).
154 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995).
155 See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247 (2d Cir. 2003); Bigio v.
Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 447 (2d Cir. 2000); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp.
880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997), affd in part, rev'd in part, 395 F.3d 932, 949 (9th Cir.
2002), reh'g en banc granted, 395 F.3d 392 (9th Cir. 2003), dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th
Cir. 2005); see also Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 188 (2d Cir. 2009) (describ-
ing where a private actor may be held liable under the ATS); Khulumani v. Barclay
Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 282-83 (2d Cir. 2007) (KatzmannJ., concurring) (stat-
ing that liability is not limited to state actors); Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth
from Reality About Corporate Responsibility Litigation, 7J. INT'L ECON. L. 263, 265 (2004)
("As history and precedent make clear, corporations can be held liable [under inter-
national law] . . . particularly when they are involved in jus cogens violations.").
156 See, e.g., Brief of Professor Christopher Greenwood, supra note 48, at 19; Brief
of ProfessorJames Crawford as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellee at 6,
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009)
(No. 07-0016).
157 See, e.g., Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity
Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARv. Hum.
RTs. J. 207, 214-15 (2008); Keitner, supra note 11, at 72 (stating U.S. law should
determine "the type of entity against which a claim can be asserted").
158 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145-49 (2d Cir. 2010).
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ent reasons. The effort by some commentators and plaintiffs' lawyers
to distinguish "conduct-regulating" norms on the one hand (to which
international law would apply), from the type of defendant involved
on the other hand (to which domestic law would apply), is not fully
convincing.159 For example, international law seems indisputably rel-
evant to the question of whether private actors as a group can be held
liable-no one appears to argue that corporations can be held
directly liable for conduct such as torture that is only actionable when
engaged in by state actors. So in broad terms at least, international
law determines the kind of defendant to whom liability can be attrib-
uted. Similarly, if international criminal law and tribunals did impose
sanctions on corporations as they do on private individuals, 160 it is
hard to see why this would not work in favor of imposing ATS liability
on corporations.
On the other hand, the duties of corporations are an increasingly
unsettled area of international law,16 ' and using domestic law to hold
companies liable for conduct that violates international norms may be
consistent with the development of customary international law in this
area. 162 Moreover, corporations are one kind of nonstate actor, and
international law now directly imposes duties on at least some non-
state actors.163 Although corporate liability is frequently rejected in
159 See Keitner, supra note 11, 72-82. Indeed, some advocates of the "conduct
regulating approach" reach the opposite conclusion: international law applies to the
question of corporate liability. See Brief of Professor Christopher Greenwood, supra
note 48, at 2-6, 19-27.
160 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Country
Reports on the Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, http://www.
oecd.org/document/24/0,2340,en_2649_34855_1933144_11_1_1 ,00.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 5, 2010).
161 See Alford, supra note 153, at 513-14; Cassell, supra note 107, at 317; Ratner,
supra note 42, at 487-88. Although most human rights conventions do not provide
for corporate liability, at least one very recent convention does so. See Council of
Europe, Trafficking Convention, supra note 109, art. 22 (providing both civil and
criminal liability for corporations). For a discussion of other international conven-
tions that impose (or require the imposition of) liability on corporations, particularly
in the labor, environmental, and financial corruption contexts, see Ratner, supra note
42, at 477-86. Canada has recently enacted legislation criminalizing some corporate
human rights violations. SeeW. Cory Wanless, Corporate Liability for International Crimes
Under Canada's Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 201,
206-07 (2009).
162 See John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010).
163 See John H. Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 27-30
(2008).
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international criminal law because many domestic legal systems do
not impose criminal liability on corporations, this reasoning does not
apply in the civil context.16 4 Finally, it is not clear that requiring plain-
tiffs to show that international law itself imposes a duty on a particular
type of nonstate actor best effectuates the intentions of Congress.
That is, having decided with the ATS to permit federal courts to hear
tort claims for certain kinds of conduct committed by nonstate
actors-piracy, violations of safe conducts, and assaults on ambassa-
dors-would Congress have intended to limit liability based on corpo-
rate form?' 65
The Second Circuit concluded in Kiobel that customary interna-
tional law, not domestic law, governs whether or not corporations can
be held liable under the ATS as one kind of nonstate actor.16 6 The
court reasoned that the ATS leaves "the question of the nature and
scope of liability-who is liable for what-to customary international
law"'67 and "whether a defendant is liable under the ATS depends
entirely upon whether a defendant is subject to liability under interna-
tional law."168 Finding little evidence that international law imposes
duties directly on corporations, the court concluded that corporations
cannot be sued under the ATS. 16 9 The insistence that international
law standing alone determines the scope of liability under the ATS is
164 See generally Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International
Criminal Law over Legal Persons: Lessons Learned from the Rome Conference on an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, in LIABILTY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 139, 146-58 (Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
165 Some dicta in Sosa could be understood as addressing the choice of law ques-
tion: "A related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liabil-
ity for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a
private actor such as a corporation or individual." Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 732 n.20 (2004). This language could be understood as suggesting that interna-
tional law should apply specifically to the issue of corporate liability, or it might be
understood as saying that international law determine whether private actors gener-
ally may be held liable. See id. at 760 (Breyer,J., concurring) (stating that the norm of
international law must "extend liability to the type of perpetrator (e.g., a private
actor) the plaintiff seeks to sue"). In any event, this language is dicta as the Sosa case
did not involve a corporate defendant.
166 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 118, 125-31 (2d Cir. 2010).
167 Id. at 122.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 120-21, 131-45. In places, the court refers to the question before it as
whether corporations are the subjects of international law. Id. at 126. For a general
discussion of this question, see Jose E. Alvarez, Are Corporations "Subjects" of Interna-
tional Law? (N.Y. Univ. Sch. Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp.,
Paper No. 10-77, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1703465.
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inconsistent with the Supreme Court's approach to the statute in
Sosa.1 70
No aspect of ATS litigation "depends entirely" upon "liability
under international law."1 7 i The statute was not understood in Sosa as
directing the courts to apply international law shorn from its domestic
law context. Indeed, as discussed above, the Sosa standard for the
underlying conduct-it must violate an international law norm of the
specificity and "acceptance among civilized nations" that piracy, viola-
tions of safe conduct, and assaults on ambassadors enjoyed in 1789-
is entirely unique to the United States. 172 Some contemporary viola-
tions of international law may not meet the universality and specificity
standard that the Court set out in Sosa. And even for the violations of
international law that meet Sosa's domestic-law-imposed-standard,
international law does not provide for "liability," at least not civil liabil-
ity. The ATS provides domestic civil liability for some violations of
international criminal law not because international law itself does so,
but instead because the Sosa Court concluded that this best effectu-
ates the historic and contemporary intentions of Congress. 73
The Kiobel opinion thus asks the wrong question: whether cus-
tomary international law imposes duties directly on corporations. The
question compelled by Sosa is instead whether Congress would have
intended corporations to be liable for conduct that is actionable
under the ATS when committed by other nonstate actors. Interna-
tional law is relevant in answering this question, of course. If interna-
tional law clearly imposed liability specifically on corporations, as it
does for individuals in some circumstances, the answer would likely be
yes, and if international law prohibited corporate liability (as it pro-
hibits most actions against states themselves), then the answer would
likely be no. But it does neither, so the issue is more difficult. Some
evidence may suggest that at least in the context of piracy, the core
original concern was to eliminate the conduct itself and provide com-
pensation to victims, without much regard to corporate form.174 The
170 Indeed, the Kiobel opinion does not itself look solely to international law.
Instead, it asks whether customary international law imposes liability on corporations
with a level of universality and specificity comparable to that with which customary
international law outlawed piracy, safe-conducts, and assaults against ambassadors in
1789. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 130, 136. This standard derives from domestic law.
171 Id. at 122.
172 See discussion supra Part II.
173 Cf Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 151-53 (Leval, J., concurring) (arguing that the failure
of international criminal tribunals to impose liability on corporations does not pre-
clude civil liability).
174 See The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40-41 (1825); 21 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESs 1774-1789, at 1136-37 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912).
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same remains true of piracy today.17 5 This is consistent with the kind
of conduct regulated in ATS cases, which is especially damaging to
international affairs. Moreover, recall that the issue of choosing
between international and domestic law for different aspects of the
case did not arise because international law was considered part of the
"general law."17 6 None of this conclusively demonstrates what Con-
gress did or would intend with respect to corporate liability, but the
important point is that congressional intent matters in the application
of the ATS.
There is another reason to view corporate liability as ultimately a
question of domestic federal common law based on international law:
it is heavily informed by an important set of policy debates that should
not be obscured through the veil of "choice of law" questions. That is,
in my view, whether one thinks that corporations should be held lia-
ble in ATS cases does not generally turn on the choice-of-law question;
rather, it works the other way around. This is not surprising because
the choice of law question in its binary form does not have an entirely
obvious answer because the policy debates are very significant and
because the outcome of this issue matters tremendously to the scope
of ATS litigation. Framing the question as one of domestic common
law may invite a resolution that beneficially focuses on some aspects of
the underlying policy concerns.
B. Corporate Liability or No?
The policy debate about corporate liability in ATS cases fre-
quently focuses on the promotion of human rights and development,
and on potential disadvantages of imposing liability on corporate
defendants with little or no connection to the United States. 177 The
second issue is addressed by international law, in particular prescrip-
tive jurisdiction, which is discussed below.178 With respect to the first
175 The Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994), provides that "every State may
seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the
control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board." See id.
This language appears to contemplate the seizure of property without limitations
based on corporate form.
176 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729; id. at 739-40 (Scalia, J., concurring).
177 See, e.g., Brief of the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Swiss
Confederation & the United Kingdom as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioner,
Sosa, 542 U.S. 642 (No. 03-339); Bellinger, supra note 49, at 8-11.
178 Note jurisdiction to adjudicate may also be an issue, although corporations
that lack any connection to the United States are not subject to personal jurisdiction
in this country. Lack of connection to the United States may also provide the basis for
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issue, opponents of corporate liability argue (especially in connection
with aiding and abetting liability) that the prospect of ATS litigation
might deter socially desirable investment in developing countries.17 9
Proponents argue that corporations should not escape liability when
they support, participate in, and benefit financially from human rights
abuses,180 that deterring human rights violations promotes growth
and development,181 and that in many ATS cases the type of industry
involved (extraction of natural resources) suggests that investment
would not be deterred because it cannot be replicated elsewhere.18 2
Contrary to the Second Circuit's decision in Kiobel, the ATS
should be interpreted to permit liability for corporations, but the
executive branch should be accorded some deference in these cases
and principles of prescriptive jurisdiction limit the overall set of
actionable claims.183 Cases against corporations should continue to
go forward (subject to the two limitations discussed in more detail
below) for the following reasons. First, as discussed in the previous
section, the appropriate question after Sosa is not whether interna-
tional law imposes duties or liability directly on corporations as one
form of nonstate actor. Instead, the question is whether Congress
would intend (or have intended) to extend liability to corporations
for conduct that meets the high Sosa standard for universality and
specificity and which is prohibited to other nonstate actors.'8 4 Sec-
dismissals on forum non conveniens grounds. See generally Cortelyou Kenney, Com-
ment, Disaster in the Amazon: Dodging "Boomerang Suits" in Transnational Human Rights
Litigation, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 857, 896-97 (2009) (arguing for the more ready use of
forum non conveniens).
179 See, e.g., Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae, supra note 96,
at 3 (reasoning in a case against corporations that "recognition of an aiding and abet-
ting claim as a matter of federal common law would hamper the policy of encourag-
ing positive change in developing countries via economic investment"); Bellinger,
supra note 49, at 5-6; Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability
in Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 271, 316-18 (2009); Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Rights Case Gone Wrong, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2009, at A19; Declara-
tion by Justice Minister Penuell Maduna, supra note 146, at 12 ("Permitting this litiga-
tion to go forward will, in the government's view, discourage much-needed direct
foreign investment in South Africa. . . ."); cf Glovin & Cohen, supra note 148 (report-
ing that the South African government now supports the litigation as narrowed by the
district court judge).
180 See Kevin R. Carter, Note, Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act: Protecting Human
Rights or Closing Off Corporate Accountability?, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 629, 648-52
(2007).
181 See Herz, supra note 157, at 227-30.
182 See Stephens, supra note 129, at 806-07.
183 See infra Part IV.
184 See supra text accompanying notes 166-76.
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ond, Congress has had ample opportunity under both Republican
and Democratic administrations to restrict or eliminate ATS cases
against corporations, but has not done so.' 8 5 This is weak indicia of
congressional intent, to be sure, but we are working in an area in
which congressional will is both important because Sosa relies so heav-
ily upon it in construing the ATS's 6 and it is very hard to divine.' 87
The Sosa opinion employed similar reasoning.188 Third, domestic
U.S. law routinely recognizes civil liability for corporations,18 9 and
there is no specific evidence that Congress did (and does) not intend
to provide for such liability with the ATS. 90
Fourth, although international law does not clearly address the
issue of civil corporate liability, it imposes some duties on nonstate
actors generally, and increasingly on corporations themselves; this is
an area of change and development in customary international law.
Fifth, for the reasons already described, Congress has a strong interest
in providing broad civil redress for the limited offense actionable
under the ATS.' 9' Corporations can only be liable when the underly-
ing conduct meets Sosa's high standard for specificity and uniformity.
Sixth, if prescriptive jurisdiction imposes real limits on ATS cases, as it
should, then the set of cases that can go forward at all is somewhat
185 An amendment to the ATS was proposed in 2005 and quickly withdrawn. See S.
1874, 109th Cong. (2005).
186 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
187 The Sosa Court looked to origins of the ATS itself, the enactment of the Tor-
ture Victim Protection Act, and the use of non-self-execution clauses in treaties. See
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004). For different reasons, these are all
difficult sources from which to infer the intentions of Congress.
188 See id. at 731 ("The position we take today has been assumed by some federal
courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, and
for practical purposes the point of today's disagreement has been focused since the
exchange between Judge Edwards and Judge Bork in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.
Congress, however, has not only expressed no disagreement with our view of the
proper exercise of the judicial power, but has responded to its most notable instance
by enacting legislation supplementing the judicial determination in some detail."
(citations omitted)); see also Ku & Yoo, supra note 68, at 174 (discussing and criticiz-
ing the Sosa Court's reliance on legislative silence as indicative of legislative intent).
189 See Mason, supra note 89, at 1173.
190 The enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)), might be helpful in
interpreting the ATS, but it is unclear whether the TVPA extends liability to corpora-
tions. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C 99-02506 SI, 2006 WL 2455752, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 22, 2006); Mujica v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1175-76
(C.D. Cal. 2005). But see Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1358-59
(S.D. Fla. 2003); Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1267
(N.D. Ala. 2003).
191 See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
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limited, reducing the overall costs associated with corporate liability in
the first place. Indeed, prescriptive jurisdiction may be an appropri-
ate basis upon which to dismiss some claims in the Kiobel case itself.
Cases that remain in U.S. courts are accordingly the very cases in
which Congress is most likely to want to see the ATS enforced, for they
involve corporations related to the United States and/or norms
around which the international consensus is very high, because the
conduct involved is especially reprehensible and disruptive to the
international order.
Finally, for the reasons described above, courts should afford
modest deference to the executive branch, at least to the extent the
executive branch expresses a view about the optimal content of evolv-
ing norms of customary international law. 192 If, for example, the
executive branch argues that customary international law should or
should not impose obligations directly on corporations and appears
generally committed to this position, courts should give this some
weight, as this is an issue on which customary international law is still
developing, and domestic ATS litigation may be used as evidence of
customary international law. In this sense the issue is similar to the
choice between knowledge and purpose as the mens rea in secondary
liability cases.
IV. PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION, UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION, AND THE ATS
This Part briefly considers prescriptive jurisdiction limits on ATS
cases. 193 Unlike the prior two Parts on accomplice and corporate lia-
bility, this section discusses potential violations of international law.
Prescriptive jurisdiction means the power of a country to apply its laws
to regulate particular conduct. It is well established that states can
exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over conduct that takes place in their
territory or over their own nationals, but ATS cases sometimes involve
the legal regulation of conduct that takes place outside the United
States by defendants that are not U.S. nationals.' 94 Universal jurisdic-
192 See supra Part II.C.2.
193 Adjudicatory jurisdiction may also be implicated in ATS cases. Arguably, uni-
versal jurisdiction allows a state both to "proscribe extraterritorial conduct with which
it has no connection, and to empower its courts to adjudicate such conduct." Donald
Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdic-
tion, 100 Am. J. Ir'L L. 142, 144 (2006).
194 Generally accepted bases for a state's jurisdiction to prescribe include: conduct
that takes place in the state's territory; the status of persons within its territory; extra-
territorial conduct that has or is intended to have substantial effect within the terri-
tory; the status or conduct of the state's own nationals; and extraterritorial conduct
1967
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tion allows a nation to prescribe conduct where it otherwise lacks the
basis for doing so, but it only includes a small set of international law
violations.' 95 In Sosa, Justice Breyer reasoned in a concurring opinion
that principles of international comity could be violated in ATS cases
where there is no other basis for jurisdiction, and where the claims
extend beyond those international norms for which universal jurisdic-
tion is accepted, a group which includes at least torture, genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.196 Consistent with Justice
Breyer's reasoning, the ATS, pursuant to standard canons of statutory
interpretation,197 and with what appears to be the original concerns
animating the statute,198 should not be interpreted in a way that vio-
lates customary international law.199 Unless there is some other basis
for prescriptive jurisdiction, the United States risks violating interna-
tional law in ATS cases, absent universal jurisdiction-assuming that
universal jurisdiction applies to civil cases at all.20 0 This could be a
directed against the security of the state. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987). Some ATS claims fall into one or
more of these categories, including cases brought against U.S. corporations. See, e.g.,
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009).
195 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 195, § 402; see also Diane F. Orentlicher,
Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal jurisdiction with Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J.
1057, 1117-18 (2004) (justifying universal jurisdiction as a means to rectifying a crime
against humanity at large, particularly when the nation involved is unable to
prosecute).
196 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761-62 (2004) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment); cf United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56,
105 (2d Cir. 2003) (chronicling the historical use of universal jurisdiction).
197 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814-19 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
198 See Lee, supra note 57, at 845-48.
199 Thus, for prescriptive jurisdiction, courts are interpreting U.S. law (here the
ATS) so as to avoid violations of international law; this is a canon of statutory interpre-
tation that relies on international law, but it is not an application of federal common
law. A second potentially relevant canon of statutory interpretation is the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality, pursuant to which U.S. courts generally interpret stat-
utes to apply to domestic but not extraterritorial conduct. See generally William S.
Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extrateritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
85 (1998) (explaining and examining the presumption). Some have argued that the
presumption applies to the ATS, but the subject matter of the statute itself would
seem to defeat the presumption.
200 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 761-62 (Breyer, J., concurring); RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 195, § 404 cmt. b; Luc REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 3 (2003) ("The
presumption is that if universal criminal jurisdiction is permissible under interna-
tional law, universal civil jurisdiction is also permissible . . . ."); Cleveland, supra note
133, at 976-77; Donovan & Roberts, supra note 193, at 153 (surveying civil remedies
for conduct subject to universal criminal jurisdiction and concluding that "[i]t could
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significant limitation on ATS litigation. As just one example,2 0 1 to the
extent that In re South African Apartheid Litigation is based on apartheid
itself, it would be dismissed unless apartheid could be established as a
universal jurisdiction offense or another basis for jurisdiction is pre-
sent.202 Universal jurisdiction is itself contested,203 and as suggested
above its application to civil cases is not firmly established. These
issues are beyond the scope of this Article, except to say that if univer-
sal jurisdiction does not apply, then ATS cases would be limited to
those situations in which another basis for jurisdiction is present.
Prescriptive jurisdiction remains an issue regardless of whether
the conduct-regulating norm in the case is understood as federal com-
mon law or international law. Even if the conduct-regulating norm is
understood as "pure" international law, the generation of a cause of
action and remedy come from domestic federal common law, raising
the prescriptive jurisdiction issue.204 As to the norms drawn from
be said" that "a permissive customary norm is beginning to emerge," or that the "well-
accepted modem rationale" for universal criminal jurisdiction extends to civil reme-
dies). Some authors have linked universal jurisdiction to domestic exhaustion of rem-
edies. See Donovan & Roberts, supra note 193, at 157-59; Orentlicher, supra note 195,
at 1130-32; see also, REYDAMs, supra, at 188-91 (discussing Menchti Turn v. Montt, 3
Yrbk Int'l Humanitarian L. 691 (Dec. 13, 2000 (Spain)). Although exhaustion is
beyond the scope of this Article, the emphasis here on applying the ATS to avoid
conflict with international law suggests that exhaustion requirements apply as well.
Cf Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 830 (9th 2008) (suggesting exhaustion may
be more important in ATS cases, given the lack of explicit consent of other
sovereigns).
201 Prescriptive jurisdiction limits might also narrow the Rio Tinto litigation. See
Sarei, 550 F.3d at 824-25 (reviewing a case against British and Australian corporations
for war crimes, crimes against humanity, racial discrimination, and environmental
harms).
202 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 337 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 195, § 404 (identifying universal jurisdiction offenses as including "piracy, slave
trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain
acts of terrorism"); cf International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid, supra note 111, art. IV (providing for universal
jurisdiction).
203 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Universal jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 323, 327-41; Orentlicher, supra note 195, 1058-65.
204 See Donovan & Roberts, supra note 193, at 144 (noting that extraterritorial
prescriptive jurisdiction is "arguably less problematic" when international law is the
"source and character of the standards," but that problems remain because of differ-
ences in remedies and enforcement, and in the inevitable variations in how interna-
tional norms are implemented through domestic legislation); Ramsey, supra note 179,
at 292-93. But see Keitner, supra note 11, at 100-01 (suggesting that the choice of law
issue for aiding and abetting should be resolved in favor of international law because
this would ease concerns about international comity (prescriptive jurisdiction)).
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international law, the question should not be whether they are termed
domestic law or international law, but instead the extent to which they
correspond to the offenses for which universal jurisdiction is
accepted. 205 In general, the limitations imposed by customary inter-
national law on a state's power to prescribe law extraterritorially cap-
ture as a legal matter the often-articulated policy concern that some
ATS litigation involves issues that have little or no connection to the
United States.
Jurisdictional limits have been taken even further by at least one
commentator who argues that accomplice liability must itselfbe a uni-
versal jurisdiction offense,20 6 even if the underlying conduct is a uni-
versal jurisdiction offense. Thus, on this view, war crimes are universal
jurisdiction offenses but aiding and abetting war crimes must be sepa-
rately established as a universal jurisdiction offense, not merely as a
violation of international law.2 0 7 Moreover, this view holds that to
establish universal jurisdiction for aiding and abetting liability, the rel-
evant sources come not from international criminal tribunals and
international conventions, but instead from the actual practice of
nation-states. 208 Universal jurisdiction is not, however, generally
understood as itself generated by state practice; instead, the basis for
universal jurisdiction is the widespread condemnation of the conduct
and the mutual interest in eradicating it-not widespread state prac-
tice of universal jurisdiction itself.209 Indeed, this is one reason that
universal jurisdiction is controversial.
With respect to secondary liability specifically, it does not seem
that universal jurisdiction must be separately established for aiding
and abetting. First, at least some states incorporating universal juris-
diction into their domestic legislation have apparently assumed that it
205 See AnthonyJ. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT'L
L. 149, 161-62 (2006).
206 See Ramsey, supra note 179, at 319-20.
207 See id.
208 See id. at 314-15.
209 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 195, § 404 cmt. a; Donovan & Roberts,
supra note 193, at 145 ("[U]niversal criminal jurisdiction remains little exercised,
albeit well accepted . . . ."); William A. Schabas, Foreword to REYDAMs, supra note 200,
at ix (noting the "stunning paucity of national practice" with respect to universal juris-
diction); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 195, § 404 reporter's note 1 (not-
ing that with respect to genocide and war crimes-for which universal jurisdiction is
largely uncontroversial-"no state has exercised such jurisdiction in circumstances
where no other basis for jurisdiction under § 402 was present"). The extent to which
state practice is necessary for the formation of customary international law is generally
contested. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Custom-
ary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 Am. J. INT'L L. 757, 770-91 (2001).
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extends to various forms of secondary liability, even where there is no
treaty providing universal jurisdiction for secondary liability. With
respect to the Geneva Conventions, for example, which do provide for
universal jurisdiction over grave breaches210 but do not include secon-
dary liability, states such as Australia 21 1 and Kenya 212 have passed
national laws providing for universal jurisdiction over those who aid in
the commission of grave breaches. 213 This state practice suggests
either that universal jurisdiction need not be separately established, or
that customary international law already recognizes universal jurisdic-
tion for aiding and abetting, at least for war crimes.
210 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, 71
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, entered into force Oct.
21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War art. 129, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War art. 146, entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
211 Until 2002, Australia provided for universal jurisdiction over a person who
"commits, or aids, abets or procures" a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, even
though the Conventions themselves did not provide aiding and abetting liability,
much less for universal jurisdiction over such offenses. See Geneva Conventions Act
1957, s 7 (Austl.), superseded by International Criminal Court Act 2002 (Austl.); see also
REYDAMs, supTa note 200, at 88-89 (quoting and describing the statute). Although
that statute was superseded, its replacement provides for universal jurisdiction over
"core ICC crimes," REYDAMs, supra note 200, at 88, presumably including secondary
liability. Cf Rome Statute, supra note 106, art. 25(3) (providing for secondary crimi-
nal liability).
212 See The Geneva Conventions Act, (1968) Cap. 198 § 3 (Kenya); see also Anto-
nina Okuta, National Legislation for the Prosecution of International Crimes in Kenya, 7 J.
INT'L CIuM. JuST. 1063, 1075 (2009) (discussing the statute).
213 See also REYDAMS, supra note 200, at 100-01 (describing an Austrian universal
jurisdiction case involving "complicity in genocide," which is covered by the Genocide
Convention, but the Convention itself does not provide for universal jurisdiction); id.
at 132-33 (describing a French statute that appears to apply universal jurisdiction to
"perpetrators or accomplices" of some international criminal law offenses); id. at
149-52, 155-56 (describing similar cases in Germany). Canada may provide a
counterexample. Canada's Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act of 2000,
S.C. 2000, c. 24, appears to provide for universal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes, id. arts. 6, 8, and provides that some kinds of assis-
tance are indictable conduct, but apparently without extending universal jurisdiction,
id. art. 6, to them. A full inventory of state practice is beyond the scope this Article,
but more examples like that of Canada would obviously undermine the thesis in this
paragraph.
1971
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
The choice that courts confront in ATS cases between interna-
tional law and federal common law is unsatisfactory and unnecessary.
Treating virtually all issues as governed by federal common law spares
courts from looking to international law for clear-cut answers that it
does not really provide, it may work to insulate them from charges
that they misunderstand and misapply international law, and it avoids
the complicated choice of law question at the outset. In reality, all
aspects of ATS litigation after Sosa are fundamentally informed by the
inferred intentions of Congress, from the question of what substantive
international norms are actionable at all, to questions of secondary
and corporate liability. The law applied by the courts in ATS cases is
shaped by domestic legal sources, and it is best to refer to it as federal
common law. Those who favor a robust international legal system and
the domestic enforcement of international law may resist this conclu-
sion, but they should not. International law does not answer some of
the questions posed by ATS litigation, and it does no real service to
international law to pretend that it does. Moreover, a careful reading
of Sosa shows that linking the ATS to the inferred intentions of Con-
gress allows U.S. courts to develop some international legal norms
beyond those that are already firmly established, as long as limits on
prescriptive jurisdiction imposed by international law itself are not
violated.
[VOL. 85:51g72
